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Sickness Absence
and Economic Incentives
Nicolas R. Ziebarth
This doctoral thesis deals with sickness absence and
economic incentives. It analyzes how economic incentives,
as set by policymakers, shape the decisions of employees to
go on sick leave.
Despite its enormous relevance, the causes and consequences of workplace absences due to sickness are an underresearched field in economics to date. While there are a large
number of studies that build upon correlates of sick leave
behavior, studies that convincingly identify how incentives
causally affect sick leave behavior are scarce.
In Germany, 4 percent of contracted labor is lost every
year due to sickness absence (Badura, Schröder, and Vetter
2008). According to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), German
employees take an average of 16.5 days of sick leave per
year, while the average number of days of sick leave varies
drastically among OECD countries between 4.1 (United
States) and 29.2 (Slovakia) (OECD Health Data 2006).
Currently, German employers spend about €25 billion per
year for statutory employer-provided sick pay. This sum
exceeds 1 percent of the total GDP. In addition, the public
health insurance fund pays out about €6 billion annually for
the long-term sick (German Federal Statistical Office 2009).
To obtain a complete picture of the total amount of benefits
paid due to work disability, one would need to add spending
by private health insurance companies, disability insurance,
and accident insurance, which replaces income losses due to
work-related disability or accidents.
However, simply summing up the total benefits severely
underestimates the total economic costs of sickness absence.
For example, if the institutional framework is unable to
prevent employees on temporary long-term sick leave
from becoming permanently disabled, the economy loses a
valuable qualified labor force. Especially in times of demographic change and a shrinking workforce, one crucial challenge of the social insurance system is to maintain employees’ capacity to work as long as possible.
To draw on another example about how sick leave behavior may trigger indirect but important side effects, think
about an inefficient sickness insurance system. On the one
hand, particularly when benefit levels are generous, one may
suspect that shirking behavior plays a substantial role. In
other words, the fraction of employees who go on sick leave
despite being able to work may be substantial. On the other
hand, especially when benefit levels are less generous or the
unemployment rate is high, presenteeism may be of importance. In other words, when a large proportion of employees
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go to work despite being sick, this may lead to spillover
effects at the workplace due to the spreading of diseases.
While most of these underlying causes and individual
reasonings are difficult to unravel empirically, this thesis
intends to shed some light on various aspects of how sick
leave behavior is shaped. I analyze how sick leave behavior
is affected by economic incentives that are varied by different policy reforms.
At the same time, I attempt to derive conclusions about
the importance of the institutional setting for successful
implementation of such reforms. Moreover, it is primarily
the institutional setting that determines which actor carries
the financial burden through the legal obligation to provide
benefits. Since employers in Germany are obliged to provide
sick pay for up to six weeks, I provide evidence on how
policy reforms impact labor costs and how the labor market
might adjust to such shocks in those costs.
The thesis consists of five independent chapters. Each
chapter represents one research study and evaluates at least
one specific policy reform in Germany. The unifying aspects
of all studies, and hence this thesis, are the following. First,
each chapter deals with sickness absence behavior and
economic incentives. Second, each chapter evaluates policy
reforms that were implemented in the mid-1990s in Germany. Third, each chapter builds upon the only data set that
contains representative sick leave information for the whole
of the German population: the Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP). Finally, each chapter makes use of the most recent
microeconometric evaluation methods, which can be classified as “reduced-form” or “nonstructural.”
Chapter 1 evaluates how a cut in the replacement level
of the statutory sickness insurance in 1996 affected the sick
leave behavior of private sector employees.1 Here, I also
approximate the impact on labor costs and calculate potential
employment effects, one of the main reform objectives.
Chapter 2, which is unpublished and is my job market
paper, evaluates how the reversal of the reform in 1999
affected sick leave behavior and labor costs. In this chapter,
I make use of the rich SOEP data set to provide evidence on
the underlying driving forces of the behavioral reactions and
on heterogeneity in the reform effects. By characterizing the
employees who were mainly responsible for the causal reactions, I also provide evidence on the potential significance
of shirking behavior and presenteeism. Lastly, this chapter
presents empirical evidence on how employers might have
reacted to the shock in labor costs in a rigid labor market
with strict dismissal protection.
Chapters 1 and 2 also serve as examples of how reform
intention and actual reform implementation of labor market
reforms may diverge in a labor market that is characterized
by Bismarckian corporatism and a high degree of collective bargaining. The organizational structure of such labor
markets restricts policymakers to merely setting federal
minimum standards. However, they have no control over the
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actual reform enforcement on the firm level, which enhances
the risk of unpopular reforms failing. The main findings from
the first two chapters, which both analyze short-term sick
leave behavior, are summarized below.
First, employees clearly adapt their short-term sick leave
behavior to changes in sick leave benefits. In 1996, the German legislature cut the statutory sick leave replacement level
for private sector employees from 100 to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. This measure led to a fall in the average
number of sick leave days of about 12 percent. Reversing the
reform in 1999 increased average sick leave days by almost
the same amount, namely by 10 percent. The response to the
reform suggests that moral hazard plays a substantial role in
the statutory sickness insurance and in the lower tail of the
sickness spell distribution.
Interestingly, the two reforms triggered behavioral reactions in different parts of the sickness day distribution. The
cut in benefits primarily induced employees to move from
very few to zero absence days per year—the proportion of
employees having zero absence days increased by about 8
percent. Contrarily, the expansion of benefits induced primarily unhealthy employees with more than 10 annual sick leave
days to take more days off.
Whether the behavioral effects were primarily triggered
by shirkers and employees who went on sick leave although
they were able to work, or by presenteeism and employees
who went to work although they were sick, remains an open
question. I present empirical evidence that is in line with
each of the two explanations.
Second, changing statutory sick leave benefit levels in an
economy that is characterized by Bismarckian corporatism
may lead to unintended side effects. Since policymakers can
only vary federal minimum standards, their influence on how
reforms are enforced on the firm level is limited. Employers
are free to provide fringe benefits over and above statutory
minimum standards. In the course of the first reform that
reduced sick pay, it became clear that German society values
a high level of statutory sick leave. A replacement level that
falls behind what employees usually earn is considered to be
unsocial by the majority of the Germans. The unpopular cut
in sick pay provoked strikes and mass demonstrations.
Eventually, many employers agreed in collective wage
agreements upon a voluntary provision of 100 percent sick
leave. Estimates suggest that between 1997 and 1999, only
half of all private sector employees effectively experienced
a decrease in actual sick pay. In this particular reform, the
divergence between reform intentions as envisioned by the
policymakers and actual reform implementation was substantial. In 1999, large parts of the reform were reversed.
To take this noncompliance in the empirical specifications
into account, I reviewed all existing collective agreements
of that time. Based on their industry and actual sick leave
scheme, I then assigned employees to different additional
treatment and controls groups, which I used in more refined
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specifications. These additional models and robustness
checks confirm my main findings.
Third, changes in the sick pay levels directly translate into
changes in labor costs because, in Germany, employers alone
are legally obliged to pay for statutory sick leave. My calculations suggest that the changes in the level of statutory sick
pay by 20 percentage points represented labor cost changes
of approximately €1.5 billion per year, considering that only
half of all employees’ sick pay was effectively cut.
In a completely flexible labor market, economic theory
would suggest that these exogenous shocks in labor costs
would directly and immediately translate into changes in
employment. Relating the estimated changes in labor costs to
the findings of other studies for Germany that used general
equilibrium models to estimate the relationship between
labor costs and employment, the employment dimension of
the sick leave reforms equates to around 50,000 jobs, relative
to 30 million employees.
However, since employment protection is high in Germany, employers were likely to react to the shocks in labor
costs in other ways. I present empirical evidence suggesting
that in the aftermath of the increase in statutory sick pay,
overtime hours increased and wages decreased in the private
sector relative to other sectors.
Chapter 3 evaluates how a cut in statutory long-term sick
pay affected the sick leave behavior of the long-term sick. I
did not find any evidence that long-term sickness absence of
over six weeks is characterized by monetary considerations.
In other words, the long-term sick do not adapt their sick
leave behavior to economic incentives. Evaluating the effects
of a cut in statutory long-term sick pay from 80 to 70 percent
of foregone gross wages in 1997, I did not find any empirical
evidence for behavioral reactions.
A theoretical model confirms this finding under the
assumption that the long-term sick are seriously ill. Thus,
moral hazard seems to be less of an issue in the upper tail of
the sickness spell distribution.
One explanation for this finding is the moderateness of
the cut in long-term sick pay, which represented on average 7 percent of the net wage. Another explanation is linked
to the severity of the underlying illness. While short-term
sick leave is mainly determined by flu and minor ailments,
the main catalysts of long-term sickness absence are cancer, chronic diseases, or mental illnesses. It is plausible that
employees diagnosed with cancer, or who are mentally ill,
are not very responsive to economic incentives.
Chapter 4 deals with convalescent care treatments. Convalescent care therapies at health spas involve periods of at
least three weeks of workplace absence for employees.2 The
chapter shows that the demand for convalescent care treatments is price responsive. The decision by the government to
double the daily copayments for convalescent care treatments from 1997 onward induced a decrease in the demand
of these therapies of about 20 percent.
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Since the question of the price elasticity of demand for
medical care is a central economic question, I derive the
following price elasticities: the price elasticity for medical
rehabilitation therapies to avoid permanent work disability
is inelastic and lies around −0.3. Slightly smaller but still
inelastic is the price elasticity for medical rehabilitation
therapies to recover from accidents at work. According to
my calculations, it is about −0.5. Conversely, I find the price
elasticity for preventive therapies at health spas to be less
than −1 and thus elastic.
The last chapter of the thesis shows how effective direct
policy measures are in comparison to indirect measures.
Direct policy measures such as increasing copayments unambiguously and universally affect the target population. Indirect measures such as cutting statutory sick pay or widening
the options for employers to cut paid vacation in the event of
long sick leave simply decrease social minimum standards.
While increasing copayments was very effective in
dampening the demand for convalescent care, the other cost
containment instruments were less effective. I did not find
any evidence that the newly introduced option for employers
to cut paid vacation in case of sickness absence due to convalescent care was effective. There is no empirical evidence
for the notion that this measure reduced the demand for
convalescent care therapies at health spas. Likewise, the cut
in statutory sick pay did not reduce the demand for convalescent care therapies.
I have two main explanations for these last two findings.
First, the cut in paid vacation may have had no effect since
many employees use some or all of their vacation days for
convalescent care in any case. Although entitled to take paid
sick leave in addition to their paid vacation, many employees
fear negative job consequences, especially when unemployment rates are high. Second, the cut in sick pay was not
necessarily a binding constraint for most employees since
they might have faced a decision of going to rehabilitation or
simply staying at home to recover. They would have been on
sick leave anyway.
Overall, evaluating five different policy reforms and their
effects on sick leave behavior, I show that short-term sick
leave behavior in particular is responsive to economic incentives. For sickness periods of over six weeks, I did not find
such evidence. Policymakers should consider the institutional setting and potential side effects when implementing
reforms. When policymakers are in a position to vary parameters that directly and universally affect the target population,
the likelihood of successful implementation of the reform
is high. As long as policymakers can only vary minimum
standards in the regulatory framework of the economy, many
actors within the institutional framework may successfully
prevent the enforcement of the reform as intended by the
policymakers. This is especially true of unpopular reforms.
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Notes
1. Chapter 1 is published as “A Natural Experiment on Sick Pay
Cuts, Sickness Absence, and Labor Costs” (Ziebarth and
Karlsson 2010).
2. Chapter 4 is published as “Estimating Price Elasticities of Convalescent Care Programmes” (Ziebarth 2010).
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